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• 
IMMIG T VISA DISTRIBUTION: 
THE CASE OF MEXICO 
• 
BERNARD TRUJILLO* 
On every immigration lawyer's desk there is a chart. A constant source 
of reference for attorneys, this chart gives a sense of how long the "waiting 
line" is for an applicant to receive a visa and enter the United States as a 
pertnanent resident. The chart is a simple, one-page affair compiled by the 
Department of State and published monthly on its website1 as well as in the 
various periodicals of the inunigration bar. 
This short Article will explore the legal origin and social impact of this 
chart, focusing on the question of how the chart regulates Mexican migration 
to the United States. This Article argues that what appears to be just another 
dull chart on a lawyer's desk actually finds its roots in a sorry act of 
international pillage an act of which the United States should be ashamed 
and for which it should make remedy. 
I. THE CHART OBSERVED 
Reproduced as Figure I is the chart (called variously the "Visa 
Availability" chart or the "Visa Numbers" chart) for February 2000, which 
is the most recent monthly chart available prior to this Article's press date. 
A few words of explanation are appropriate. The vertical axis of the 
chart represents the various statutory categories through which an applicant 
may qualify for an immigrant visa.2 The horizontal axis shows how access 
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Princeton University; J.D., 1992, Yale Law School. Thanks to Kevin Johnson, Neil Komesar\ 
Jane Larson, Steve Legomsky, Michael Morgana, Michael Olivas, and Victoria Trujillo. Due 
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I. See United States Department of State, Bureau of Consumer Affairs, Visa 
Bulletin (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://travel.state.gov/visa_bulletin.html>. 
2. The three main ways of qualifying for an innnigrant visa are (1) being petitioned 
in as a close family member of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident; (2) entering as a skilled 
worker or employee of a U.S. employer; and (3) winning a lottery designed to enhance the 
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Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 ( 1998); Howard F. Chang, Immigration Policy, Liberal 
Principles, and the Republican Tradition, 85 GEO. L.J. 2l OS, 2108.-09 ( 1997); Jan C. Ting, 
uOther than a Chinaman": How the U.S. Immigration Law Resulted from and Still Reflects 
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to visas varies country by country. The "C's'' on the chart stand for 
"current," and the dates indicate the backlogs for the various categories. 
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Figure l: Visa Availability for February 2000 
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The chart works like the "NOW SERVING" device at your local 
delicatessen. Suppose you enter the deli and take a number, say number 39. 
The "NOW SERVING" display reads 25. You figure that there are 14 
customers who will be served before your turn comes up. Depending on how 
quickly the line is moving, that could mean a wait of a few short minutes or 
quite a while. 
Now suppose that the client is from Bulgaria arid she seeks to enter as 
a married daughter of a U.S. citizen (i.e., the 3rd Family Preference category). 
The attorney locates the 3rd Family Preference row and the ~'All Other 
Countries" column and sees "220CT95." This means that those applicants 
who be:gan seeking admission on October 22, 1995, are now being served. 
The Bulgarian client, beginning the process in February 2000, could have 
four years and four months worth of applicants ahead ofher.3 The attorney, 
who has been watching how quickly the numbers have been moving, will 
then be able to give the client a general sense of how long she has to wait. 
The horizontal axis of the chart virtually screams out from the page. A 
few countries have been isolated for special treatment. Depending on the 
client's national origin, the length of her wait could vary dramatically. This 
national origin discrimination is the fruit of the "per country limits" Congress 
has placed on the distribution of visas. Every country is entitled to a flat 
seven percent of all inunigrant visas available for that year.4 The annual per-
country ceilings are generally in the neighborhood of 15,820 family visas per 
country, and 9,800 employment visas per country. There is no adjustment in 
the per:..country ceiling for countries with large populations, or for countries 
that are geographically adjacent to the U.S., or for countries that historically 
send inunigrants to the U.S. in large numbers. Luxembourg has the same 
visa ceiling as China and Mexico. 
Looking at the February 2000 numbers, the discrimination is tangible. 
For the first family preference (unmarried sons and daughters of citizens) 
applicants from the Philippines have to wait ten years, and applicants from 
Mexico five years, longer than applicants from the rest of the world. In both 
of the second preferences (spouses and children ofpennanent residents, and 
· ed sons and daughters of pennanent residents) Mexicans have to wait 
one year longer than all other countries. With the third category (married 
sons and daughters of citizens) Filipinos wait eight years; and Mexicans four 
years, more than the rest of the world. And for the fourth preference category 
(brothers and sisters of adult citizens), Filipinos must wait nine years, and 
3. I say "could have" because the chart only tells us about the past (i.e., someone 
who began the process in October 1995 is being served in February 2000); it cannot predict 
the future. Since the number of people who enter the queue and the INS formulae that 
determine visa availability both vary year to year, the chart can only provide a "guesstimate" 
of future waiting time. 
4. Some applicants for admission into the United States are exempt from the per-
country limit, most notably people who are "immediate relatives" (i.e., children, spouses, and 
parents) of a citizen. Large numbers of immediate relatives gain admission every year. 
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Indians_ one year, longer than applicants from all other countries. While the 
per-country limits do affect the waiting time for employment visa, the effect 
on the distribution of family visas is much more dramatic. 
Along with India, China is also frequently featured on the chart's 
horizontal axis, and I have seen Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, _and El 
Salvador pass through in years past Mexico and the Philippines are fixtures 
of the horizontal axis. 
II. THE CHART APPRAISED 
A. U.S. Interests in Culture and Economy 
Can this practice of national origin discrimination be justified? It is 
beyond question that such discrimination, if levied by the U.S. government 
against its citizens, would be unconstitutional. But the hard lesson of 
innnigration law is that Congress may make rules in the inunigration context 
"that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.''5 Obviously, inflicting 
burdens on Filipinos and Mexicans for no other reason than their national 
origin offends some basic notion of"immigrants' rights." But the prevailing 
argument in Congress, the courts, and Main Street is that immigrants have no 
"right" to come to the United States -entry into the U.S. and participation in 
its market and polity are privileges that the U-.S. -may extend or withdraw at 
its pleasure and for its own interests. 
What are the U.S-. interests that are offered to justify the discrimination 
worked by the per-country ceilings? The main justification for the ceilings 
usually takes this fonn: The U.S. has a legitimate interest in a "diverse 
stream'' of immigrants, so that people from a few nations do not dominate the 
flow, taking scarce visas away from innnigrants of less represented lands. If 
the per~country ceilings were removed (while still limiting the total number 
of inunigrants allowed in annually) it is possible that the immigrant stream 
would be mainly Mexican and Filipino, and the U.S. would be a poorer 
nation because of it. 
Suppose we accept arguendo the (somewhat Herculean) assumption that 
. . 
dropping or altering the per-country ceilings would achieve a dynamic in 
which the inunigrant flow comes to be consistently dominated by a few high-
demand countries~ We must then scrutinize the notion that more immigrants 
from Asia and Latin America, and fewer immigrants from, say, Europe, 
would somehow impoverish the United States. There are at least two ways 
in which one might say that the U.S. would be "poorer" if its immigrant 
stream was less diverse. One involves a cultural claim and the other involves 
an economic claim. 
5. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). 
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A first stab at enunciating the cultural claim might go like this: The 
inunigrant stream should be diverse because diversity is a good in itself, and 
the U.S. benefits from diversity. This claim runs aground, however, when we 
notice that the people who dominate the innnigrant flow are actually under-
represented in the general population of the United States. Nobody can make 
a straight-faced claim that having more Latinos and Asians around would 
make the U.S. a less diverse place. 
Nor can ·there be one sort of diversity that is good for the itnmigrant 
stream and another sort of diversity that is good for the U.S. general 
population.. The irnmigrant stream is a stream of people seeking to be 
permanent residents of the United States. The qualities of this stream must 
be appraised by how they correspond to the population as a whole. 
Considering the inunigrant stream as separate from the thing it is streaming 
into, and holding different standards for each, is an error. Thus, diversifying. 
the itmnigrant stream must intend some goal other than achieving diversity 
for its own sake. This other goal must be revealed and defended in order to 
argue. successfully that the U.S. has a bona fide interest in controlling the 
ethnic content of the inunigrant stream. 
The rest of the "cultural" argument might go like this: The United States 
has an interest in preserving its culture. As it stands, the U.S. culture to-be-
preserved is pritnarily European. Any transfonnation of the extant culture is 
to be resisted, or at least stalled, so that U.S. citizens and institutions will 
have more time to adjust. 
Beyond certain quarters of U.S. society, this claim cannot be voiced 
without a twinge of embarrassment, and in any case the claim is difficult to 
defend. First, it is certainly controversial that U.S. culture is predominantly 
European. The United States is a country blesse.d with a rich and diverse 
heritage. It is home to both New England and New Mexico, and it has legacy 
from the namesakes of both. Second, if it can be said that the culture and 
institutions of the U.S. are dominated by a given ethnic group, that 
domination can only be temporary and accidental. One hundred fifty years 
ago, this was a nation as hostile to the Irish and most other Europeans as it is 
to the Latinos and Asians of today. The cultural constitution of the United 
States is an open set, and constantly subject to fundamental change. This is 
the price (if one can call it so) of living in a free society. Finally, there is the 
she.er futility of attempts at cultural engineering. Trying to control the 
direction of culture in an open society is like trying to drive the clouds. Such 
attempts would be amusing if they were not so costly and hurtful. 
One might also claim that an inunigrant stream dominated by a few 
countries would impoverish the U.S. in an economic sense-that the U.S. has 
a legitimate interest in reaching out to other immigrants in order to enhance 
the labor pool and bring economic value to the United States. But where the 
cultural argument for the per-co-:.~ntry limits survives only within the crabbed 
confines of tendentious assumptions, the economic argument perishes even 
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on its oWn terms._ It is an axiom of price theory that the allocation of goods 
is properly a function of demand. In this case, it would be most economically 
efficient for all involved (i.e., the individual immigrant and the U.S. economy 
as a whole) to allocate visas to the innnigrants who want them the most. If 
they are lining up around the block to buy your product in Sheboygan, 
Wisconsin, and they are leaving_ your product on the shelves in Waunakee, 
the rational businessperson would move some merchandise from Waunake_e 
to Sheboygan. Doing so would redound to the value of the business (i.e., 
sales, and perhaps the price-per-item, would increase). 
In the same way, keying allocation of visas to demand can only redound 
to the value of the U.S. economy. Really wanting a visa, and being willing 
to uproot oneself from home to labor in a foreign land, evinces qualities (e.g .. , 
industriousness, creativity; doggedness, flexibility) that make the U.S. 
economy smile. 
If the U.S. denies visas to applicants who want them the most, it can 
only be because the U.S. is betting that the applicants' intense demand will 
not translate into productivity and value for the U.S. economy. But why 
would national origins be a useful indicator forcpredicting which applicants 
will be most productive? It is as though the U.S. were saying, ''We know that 
you fervently desire to uproot yourself from your home to come and make a 
living here. But because you are from Mexico or the Philippines we think 
that you will not work as well or as hard as someone from Europe." Here, the 
economic argument in favor of national origins discrimination tails off into 
the cultural argument, and carries the scent of the same irrationality. 
B. Discerning Demand 
Let us return to the chart. At first glance, one could conclude that the 
chart tells us something about the demand for U.S. visas by indicating which 
countries have the longest waiting lines. On that analysis Filipinos and 
Mexicans (and to a lesser extent, Indians and also Chinese) have consistently 
had the greatest demand for U.S. visas. 
But that conclusion needs qualification. For the family preference 
categories, the immigrant applying for a visa needs to be petitioned in by a 
family member who is already a U.S. citizen or perrnanent resident. In the 
parlance of the immigration bar, the immigrant needs a family "anchor'' in the 
United States. Thus, the chart does not register pure demand for visas. In 
order for an aspiring immigrant's demand to be measurable by the 
Department of State, that immigrant must be "pre-qualified'' by having a 
family anchor. It is possible that Bulgarians demand visas at the same level 
as Mexicans, but the Bulgarians have fewer anchors and so their "waiting 
line" appears shorter. 
Note that having a family anchor is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for seeking a visa (and thus_ having one's "demand'; registered on 
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the chart). Witness the distribution of family preference visas in the years 
immediately following 1965. Prior to 1965, the U.S. employed a "national 
origins formula', for detennining per-country visa allocation: Visas were 
distributed to maintain the status quo ethnic distribution of the United States. 
This fonnula had the effect of awarding the broad majority of visas to 
applicants from European nations. In 1965 the U.S. switched from the 
"national origins formula, to the systern of family and employment 
preferences now in place. 
One would expect that if the presence of a family anchor was a 
significant detertnining factor in the application of close relatives seeking 
admission (an alleged phenomenon called "chain migration', or the 
"multiplier effect',), we would have seen waves of European immigration 
continue at a very high rate after 1965. In fact, we saw itnmigrants from 
Europe decrease sharply, and immigrants from Asia and Latin America 
increase sharply, in the post-1965 years. 
Thus there appear to be two equally important components for having 
measurable demand for a U.S. visa: having a family anchor and having the 
desire to apply. As to the second of these components, the economic logic of 
demand-based allocation seems compelling giving visas to applicants with 
the highest demand best serves U.S. interests. Proponents of attempts to 
engineer the ethnic content of the immigration stream through per-country 
limits (as well as other measures such as the "diversity lottery'') resist the 
~lear economic logic of demand-based allocation by pointing to the ftrst, 
. 
~'pre-qualification,' component of demand. They argue that because there are 
so many Mexicans (or Filipinos, or Indians) already present in the U.S., a 
legal regime that allowed for family members freely to petition in family 
members would give applicants from Mexico (or the Philippines, or India) an 
unfair "advantage" meriting legal correction. Thus, the argument goes, 
measures that allegedly discriminate in favor of European itnmigrants and 
against Asian and Latino immigrants actually just "level the playing field." 
C. The ~~Mexican Advantage " 
In what sense is the "playing field, lopsided? Answering that question 
requires a closer exploration of particular institutions and relevant social 
history. Accordingly, the balance of this Article shall focus exclusively on 
the case of Mexico. I contend that the peculiar relationship between Mexico 
and the U.S. has created conditions that tend to enhance migration patterns, 
but that these conditions are far from a Mexican "advantage', requiring that 
additional corrective burdens be placed upon Mexican migration. I believe 
that similar arguments could be marshaled in the cases of the Philippines, 
China, India, and perhaps other nations, but I am not attempting to make 
those arguments here. 
• 
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. . . . 
There are a great number of Mexican ''anchors" in the United States. 
There are also a great number of other Mexican nationals, who might be 
called ''magnets" in that they are present in the U.S. and serve to attract the 
migration of other Mexicans, but they do not have the legal capacity to 
"petition in" others (typically because they are here on temporary visas or 
because they are undocumented). A short list of institutional factors 
explaining the presence of these-anchors and magnets might include: ( 1) the 
lmtnigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which granted amnesty to 
several thousands of erstwhile undocumented foreign nationals, many of them 
from Mexico (those granted amnesty were allowed to become pennanent 
residents and citizens, thus attaining the capacity to petition in close relatives 
via the family preference categories); (2) enhanced ease of entry as temporary 
low-skilled laborers under the "Seasonal Agricultural Worker" program; (3) 
a history of U.S. programs designed to tap Mexican labor, most notoriously 
the "Bracero" programs; and ( 4) no ceilings on immigration from the Western 
Hemisphere countries, including Mexico, until 1965. 
But is it a discrimination in favor of Mexico, properly remediable by 
legal measures, that there are large numbers of Mexicans ·with vibrant ties to 
Mexico already present in the United States? Stephen Legomsky, in an 
excellent piece criticizing the "diversity lottery," rejects the proposition that 
the family preferences regime constitutes remediable de facto discrimination 
in favor of Asian and Latino immigrants.6 By way of analogy, Legomsky 
observes that very few Canadians seek asylum in the United States. In order 
to obtain asylum, an applicant has to show that she suffers or has a reasonable 
fear of suffering from persecution in her home country. It just so happens 
that few citizens of Canada could meet that definition. But the low number 
of Canadian asylees is not evidence of de facto discrimination against 
Canada. It is just a natural fact, not remediable by law, that Canadians are 
typically ineligible to apply for asylum. Legomsky concludes that the large 
number of Asian and Latino residents who are present in the U.S. and able 
to petition in their family members is just a natural fact and not evidence of 
remediable discrimination. 
Taking Legomsky one, step further, 1 suggest that the alleged ''Mexican 
advantage" is not merely a "natural fact" that fails tojustify placing additional 
burdens on Mexican migration. I suggest that the enhanced migration 
patterns that we observe from Mexico to the U.S. are the result of past unjust 
acts by the United States that themselves call for remedy. Rather than placing 
burdens upon Mexican migration, justice requires that the U.S. facilitate that 
migration. 
The United States has a history of alienating the land and labor resources 
of Mexico. Regarding labor, much has been written about the horrors of the 
Bracero program and Operation Wetback, the summary deportation of 
6. See Legomsky, supra note 2, at 331-34. 
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Mexican workers in the 1950s. There have also been other rnass deportation 
programs, including a period in the 1930s when thousands of U.S. citizens 
of Mexican descent were expatriated during a time when the "domestic" labor 
pool had swelled, causing the need for Mexican labor to evaporate_. 7 Despite 
much symbolic spee_ch condemning undocumented Mexican labor, the U.S. 
economy and legal authorities are actually quite ambivalent, allowing 
Mexicans to build up reasonable expectations that their labor will be 
welcomed in the United States.8 
Regarding U.S. alienation of Mexican land, the major events are the 
annexation of Texas in 1845 and, perhaps most significantly, the war between 
the U.S. and Mexico culminating in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 
The Treaty, signed at gunpoint as U.S. forces occupied Mexico City, ceded 
. . 
between one-third and one-half of Mexico's territory to the U.S., including 
all of what is now California, Nevada, and Utah, most of New Mexico and 
Arizona, and parts of Colorado and Wyoming. The U.S. had offered to buy 
the land, Mexico declined, and the war followed soon thereafter. A 
dispassionate reading of this history supports the conclusion that the War and 
the Treaty were little more than a "land-grab." Indeed, the entire history of 
Mexican-U.S. relations suggests the image of a strong country serially 
mugging, at will and without remorse, its weaker neighbor to the south. 
How might these events enhance Mexican migration? The patterns of 
Mexican migration we observe are partially attributable to the vibrant and 
ongoing relationships betwe_en Mexicans in Mexico and Mexicans (along 
with persons of Mexican descent) in the United States. A Mexican national 
fixes her eyes on the U.S. with a mixture of hope and resentment: hope 
because she knows her labor will be welcomed by the economy and she will 
be welcomed by networks of Mexicans who have come weeks and 
generations before; resentment because she believes the border is 
fundamentally false. In going North, there is still a sense in which she is 
going_ home. 
Also contributing to the obsession that might lead to inunigration is the 
sick fascination one might call "Loser's History.'' One is much more likely 
to catch a self-described Alabaman than a self-described New Yorker 
fantasizing about Pickett's Charge. In fact, the average New Yorker in 
unlikely even to have heard of Pickett's Charge.9 In historic confrontations, 
7. See generally FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA ET AL., DECADE OF BETRAYAL: 
MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930s (1 995); JUAN RAMON GARCiA, OPERATION WETBACK: 
THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 (1980); KITIY 
CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE (1992); Michael Olivas, The Chronicle, My Grandfather's 
Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicles as Racial History, 34 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 425 (1990). 
8. See. e.g., Gerald P. L6pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a 
Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REv. 615, 618 ( 1981 ). 
9. Pickett's Charge was the decisive moment of the Battle of Gettysburg (which. 
in its turn, is taken to be the turning_ point of the U.S. Civil War) in which a gambit by the 
• 
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where land or honor changes hands, the losers are apt to feel the sting far 
longer than the winners. To this day~ U.S. exchange students_ at the Mexican 
National War College are not allowed to observe the war games, perhaps 
because the Mexicans are fighting again, but with different results, the Battle 
of Cerro Gordo. And to this day, the average U.S. native has never even 
heard of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 
ill. TOWARD REMEDY 
This Article began with a very modest inquiry: whether we can justify 
the national origins discrimination underlying the distribution of immigrant 
visas. I have argued that we cannot. U.S. interests in culture or economy do 
not justify attempts to engineer the ethnic composition of the immigrant 
stream. In the case of Mexico, moreover, I have argued that any perceived 
"advantage" held by Mexicans seeking admission to the U.S. is not a wrong 
to be remedied, but rather the upshot of wrongs that require remedy. 
If this modest inquiry were to end modestly, I could conclude simply that 
the per-country limits should be abandoned and the visas distributed to the 
applicants who want them, or at least that the limits should be relaxed for 
countries that are substantially affected. But what began as a quarrel with a 
lawyer's chart has brought us to a question much more vast: Does a history 
of injustice make a legal difference? Do past acts of oppression contain 
current legal relevance? One can readily call to mind other aggrieved 
populations within the U.S.-polity, and their arguments, sometimes prevailing 
and sometimes not, that past injustice merits present legal rights. Foremost 
among these arguments is the claim that ''past" wrongs are not purely past. 
They live on in unjust structures that perpetuate yesterday's wrongs~ paying 
their passage into tomorrow. 
The United States is a nation that must come to live with its history. Our 
nation's road to empire is marked with unjust acts. Roads to empire always 
are.. The test of greatness_ under law is whether we will bend to remedy those 
injustices. 
Confederate army failed spectacularly. 
